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Introduction
This paper is the second of two papers in this issue on the Numeracy Infusion
Course for Higher Education (NICHE) project1 to promote quantitative reasoning
(QR) across disciplines at the City University of New York (CUNY). NICHE is a
predominantly online course to train faculty to (1) articulate QR learning goals;
(2) create a QR lesson to help students achieve these goals; and (3) develop an
instrument to assess student learning. Following enrollment in NICHE, every
instructor will teach a QR-infused course to implement the instructional materials
that they developed during the faculty training program. In the first paper (Wang
and Wilder 2015), we outline the content of a NICHE unit on the phenomena of
human intuition leading to faulty judgment, and how to apply cognitive science to
QR instruction. This paper describes an effort to use NICHE material to teach the
medical diagnosis problem, and more broadly Bayesian reasoning (to be
explained shortly), in an elementary statistics course at a community college.
Assessment results of student learning from 2013 to 2014 will be reported.
Psychological research on Bayesian reasoning, particularly the method of solving
the medical diagnosis and mammography problems using the natural frequency
representation, provides the backdrop for the student learning activities described
in the paper.

Interpreting Medical Test Results: Bayesian
Reasoning
The medical diagnosis problem was first published in the New England Journal of
Medicine (Casscells et al. 1978).
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of
5%, what is the chance that a person found to have positive result actually has
the disease, assuming you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs?

This is a standard Bayesian reasoning problem, in which the probability of a cause
(e.g., disease) has to be inferred from an observed effect (e.g., a positive result).
This problem could be approached formally using Bayes’ rule, which is a simple
mathematical formula shown below. However, Casscells et al. found that only 11
of the 60 subjects (consisting of Harvard Medical School faculty, staff and
students) gave the correct probability, 2%. Twenty-seven respondents vastly
overestimated the probability by answering 95%. Many other studies show that

1
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clinicians miscalculated the probability in similar problems (Eddy 1982; Hoffrage
and Gigerenzer 1998; Gigerenzer 2002).
The medical diagnosis problem, and more broadly Bayesian inference
problems, have become the subject of an intense debate among psychologists
(Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Gigerenzer 1996).
To understand the debate, one needs to know the different interpretations of
probability. Although probability as a mathematical axiomatic theory is well
established, its interpretation is still an unsettled issue (McGrayne 2011). The
“frequentists” interpret probability as a measure of how frequently the event will
occur when the experiment is continually repeated. On the other hand, the
“Bayesians” regard probability as a subjective measure of belief (hence the name
“subjective probability”). The Bayesians allow the assignment of probabilities to
a single event (e.g., the outcome of a single toss of a coin, or the probability of
having breast cancer after a positive mammography), which is considered
meaningless for the frequentists. The paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1974)
and follow-up studies suggest that probability theory is systematically counterintuitive. However, some psychologists argued that if the same problem is
expressed in terms of frequencies rather than probabilities, people are more
accurate at estimating the probability (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; Cosmides
and Tooby 1996). The disagreement among statisticians and philosophers about
the interpretation of probability is in part responsible for the disagreement among
psychologists (Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Gigerenzer 1996). Despite the lack
of consensus on the cause of biases in assessing subjective probability, the
method of obtaining probability from frequency representation has been reported
to be successful in training professionals in solving medical and legal problems
(Hoffrage and Gigerenzer 1998; Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer 2001; Gigerenzer
2002).
The probability of having a disease given a positive medical test result is a
conditional probability, which can be formally approached using Bayes’ rule,
𝑃(𝐻|𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐻)

𝑃(𝐷|𝐻)
𝑃(𝐷)

where the symbols 𝐻 and 𝐷 are for the hypothesis (e.g., disease) and data
obtained (e.g., positive result), respectively. We refrain from further elaborating
this abstract formula, as a mathematical approach can be found in any probability
textbook (e.g., Ross 2014). Some researchers contend that Bayesian reasoning
does not necessarily mean inserting probabilities into the formula; they suggest
that Bayesian reasoning can occur naturally. To appreciate such a point of view,
consider this example (Gill et al. 2005). Patient 1 is an obese 72 year old man
with poorly controlled hypertension, and Patient 2 is a 28 year old, 44 kg, non-
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smoking, vegan woman who competes regularly in triathlons. Patient 1 was
rushed to the emergency after crushing chest pressure, and Patient 2 came in
because she felt dizzy after running 20 km in hot weather. Both have an abnormal
electrocardiogram. Logically, clinicians would suspect a heart attack for Patient 1,
and consider such a diagnosis very unlikely for Patient 2. Bayesian reasoning
takes the prior probability (patients’ background) into account, and the posterior
probability of heart attack diagnosis (after electrocardiogram) can be obtained
from the formula, whereby “the pre-test odds of a hypothesis being true
multiplied by the weight of new evidence (likelihood ratio) generates post-test
odds of the hypothesis being true” (Gill et al. 2005).
The failure of Bayesian reasoning reported in the psychological literature is
often attributed to research subjects’ “base rate neglect,” the condition that the
prior probability is ignored or significantly underweighted (Bar-Hillel 1980).
However, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) presented evidence that people are “good”
at Bayesian reasoning when they are given frequencies as input and asked for
frequencies as output. They argue that instead of saying 8%, it is easier for the
human mind to consider “8 out of 100 people” or “80 out of 1000 people,” based
on their research on evolutionary theory. They rewrote the medical diagnosis
problem by Casscells et al. (1978) as the following.
1 out of every 1000 Americans has disease X. A test has been developed to detect
when a person has disease X. Every time the test is given to a person who has
the disease, the test comes out positive (i.e., the “true positive” rate is 100%).
But sometimes the test also comes out positive when it is given to person who is
completely healthy. Specifically, out of every 1000 people who are perfectly
healthy, 50 of them test positive for the disease (i.e., the “false positive” rate is
5%).
Imagine that we have assembled a random sample of 1000 Americans. They
were selected by a lottery. Those who conducted the lottery had no information
about the health status of any of these people.
Given the information above:
On average,
How many of these 1000 people will have the disease?
How many of the 1000 people will have the disease AND test positive for it?
How many of the 1000 people will be healthy AND test positive for the disease?
How many of the 1000 people will test positive for the disease, whether they have
the disease or not?
How many people who test positive for the disease will actually have the
disease? ___ out of ___

Published by Scholar Commons, 2015
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Cosmides and Tooby show that this frequency representation of the medical
diagnosis problem elicited correct Bayesian reasoning from 92% of subjects and
helped to eliminate base rate neglect.2
Similarly, Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage (1995) performed an
experiment on the “mammography problem.” The standard probability format
reads:
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a woman at age forty who participates
in routine screening. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that
she will get a positive mammography. If a woman does not have breast cancer,
the probability is 9.6% that she will also get a positive mammography. A woman
in this age group had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is
the probability that she actually has breast cancer?

Eddy (1982) reported that 95 out of 100 physicians estimated the probability to be
between 70% and 80%, much greater than the correct answer, 7.8%. But
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage discovered that by using the frequencies, more students
and physicians could obtain the correct probability for the mammography
problem in accordance with Bayes’ rule (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995). They
represented the problem as the following.
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine screening
have breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive
mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a
positive mammography. Here is a new representative sample of women at age
forty who got a positive mammography in routine screening. How many of these
women do you expect to actually have breast cancer? ___ out of ___

In his book Calculated Risk, Gigerenzer (2002) summarizes and clarifies his
findings and presents a systematic method to guide clear thinking of subjective
probability. (The method can be applied to many other situations. For example,
Gigerenzer used it to analyze the relationship between wife battering and spousal
murder in the United States to refute Alan Dershowitz’s claim in the O. J.
Simpson case.) The key is to think in terms of natural frequencies, simple counts
of events, rather than in more abstract notations of percentages, odds, or
probabilities. (Incidentally, Steven Strogatz (2012) reported that a few of his
Cornell students discovered this trick independently and would avoid using Bayes’
2

A Numeracy reviewer pointed out that if subjects are given a detailed method for solving a
problem, one might expect a better success rate. I thank the reviewer for raising some issues about
the Bayesian/frequentists debate among psychologists. To avoid misunderstanding, Cosmides and
Tooby (1996) used the term bayesian reasoning (with a small “b”) to refer to any cognitive
procedure that causes subjects to reliably produce answers that satisfy Bayes’ rule, whether that
procedure operates on representations of frequencies or single-event probabilities. In this way,
they can, without contradiction, ask the question, “Do frequentist representations elicit bayesian
reasoning?”
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rule and solve the problems by an equivalent method.) Before further discussing
the method, we need to define pertinent basic medical terms.
No test is 100 percent accurate, and there will inevitably be “false positives”
and “false negatives.” “False positive rate” is the proportion of positive tests
among people without the disease. 3 “Sensitivity” or true positive rate is the
proportion of individuals with a disease who test positive in a test.4 The “base
rate” of an attribute in a population is the proportion of individuals manifesting
that attribute. (A synonym for base rate is “prevalence.”) For the above
mammography problem, the base rate for a woman at age forty is 1%, the
sensitivity of mammography is 80%, and the false positive rate is 9.6%. Boersma
and Willard’s (2008) Numeracy paper on false positives has a comprehensive list
of terminology. It also provides guidance on how to organize a test’s four
possible outcomes in a two-way table.
With Gigerenzer’s method of a frequency representation, the mammography
problem is translated to:
Ten out of every 1000 women have breast cancer. Of these 10 women with
breast cancer, 8 will have a positive mammogram. Of the remaining 990
women who don’t have breast cancer, some 95 will still have a positive
mammogram. Imagine a sample of women who have positive mammograms in
screening. How many of these women actually have breast cancer?

Numerical information in this statement can be presented in a tree of natural
frequencies (Fig. 1). The information is the same as before (with rounding), but it
is much easier to see what the answer is: only 8 of the 103 women who test
positive (8 + 95) actually have breast cancer, which is 7.8% when expressed in
probabilities.

Figure 1. A natural frequency tree for the mammography problem
adapted from Eddy (1982).
The term “specificity” used in medical literature is complementary to the false positive rate (i.e.,
the specificity and the false positive rate add up to 100 percent). It is also called “true negative
rate.”
3

4

The sensitivity and the false negative rate add up to 100 percent.
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Below is the method of natural frequencies summarized in four steps (Hoffrage
et al. 2000):
1. Select a population and use the base rate to determine how many people in
the population have the disease.
2. Take the result and use the test’s sensitivity to determine how many
people have the disease and a positive test.
3. Take the remaining number of healthy people and use the test’s falsepositive rate to determine how many people do not have the disease but
still test positive.
4. Compare the number obtained in step 2 and the sum of those obtained in
steps 2 and 3 to determine how many people with a positive test actually
have the disease.

Assessing Students’ Learning of Bayesian
Reasoning
Before reporting on the NICHE classroom activities, it is relevant to review the
rationale for emphasizing the medical diagnosis problem in a QR-infused course.
In the first NICHE paper, Wang and Wilder (2015) outlined research results on
cognitive illusions showing that a person’s beliefs and behaviors do not
necessarily correspond to scientific and statistical evidence. There are numerical
examples in real life reflecting such a conflict. For example, in 2009, the United
States Preventive Services Task Force advised most women in their forties not to
have annual mammograms. The response was immediate, and it elicited a public
outcry (McGrayne 2011). John Allen Paulos wrote in the New York Times
Magazine that “both the panel’s concerns and the public’s reaction to its
recommendations may be better understood by delving into the murky area
between mathematics and psychology” (Paulos 2009). Many people intuitively
believe that early detection through medical tests is invariably beneficial for them,
but studies suggested that false positives in mammography often led to
unnecessary overtreatment (for an account for the general audience, see Orenstein
2013). Many studies revealed the limits of screening, and the danger of
overdiagnosis and overtreatment; these studies have been publicized in the media,
(e.g., Parker-Pope 2011 and 2012; Paulos 2012; Kolata 2014).
NICHE is predicated on the proposition that media articles are useful in
promoting quantitative reasoning.5 Moreover, students’ quantitative analysis of
5

Using media articles to teach quantitative reasoning has been advocated by other educators. For
example, Madison et al. (2012) is a textbook to guide students to examine public media articles to
develop quantitative reasoning skills.
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medically related issues will have a profound impact on themselves, their family
and their community. Contextualized use of numbers and data in a matter that
involves critical thinking skills is the working definition of quantitative reasoning
for NICHE. In short, the medical diagnosis problem encompasses key skills that
we want students to develop. Students need to correctly identify and interpret the
base rate, sensitivity, and false positive rate stated in the problem, and they need
to process these numerical values into the posterior probability. The calculated
result can further prompt them to think about the implication of the probability.
Assume, for example, that 11% of patients who test positive for cancer actually
have it. What is the cost of treating a perfectly healthy person, and what is the
cost of withholding treatment? For the above-mentioned reasons, we contend that
an in-depth study of the medical diagnosis problem is highly valuable.
For three semesters, we included the medical diagnosis and mammography
problems in the syllabus of an honors elementary statistics course, adapting the
approach of natural frequency representations developed by Gigerenzer and his
colleagues. Although students in the honors section are highly motivated, there is
still a considerable variation in their interest and ability. Some engineering
majors have completed calculus courses and are comfortable with calculations,
yet some students who just exited remedial algebra experience difficulty in
conversion among fractions, percents and decimals. Gigerenzer reported that
more than 90% of students obtained the correct rate after training students from
the University of Chicago and the University of Munich (Sedlmeier and
Gigerenzer 2001). It is interesting to see whether such a method is effective for a
less-uniform student population. What follows should not be regarded as a
rigorous psychological experiment: our sample was nonrandom and our primary
purpose was to help students learn. We followed the standard human subjects
research protocols approved by CUNY’s Institutional Review Board, and most
students granted us their consent to allow us to share data collected in this
classroom activity: among 56 students over three semesters, only 4 declined.
The gist of natural frequencies is covered in a Scientific American Mind
article “Knowing Your Chances” by Gigerenzer et al. (2008). When covering the
probability sections of the statistics course, students were assigned to read this
article and were informed that they would be tested on it. A week later, in an
open-book and open-note quiz, students were given the mammography problem
by Eddy (1982) (the standard probability format in Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
1995) shown earlier, with a slightly different base rate for breast cancer for
women in their forties obtained from the website of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.6

6

Breast Cancer Risk by Age: http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/breast/statistics/age.htm (accessed
September 15, 2014).
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When students were quizzed on the mammography problem for the first time,
essentially none of them had any idea about how to solve it. Only one student in
the 2013 Fall semester successfully applied Gigerenzer’s method to solve this
problem on the first attempt. Most of the students simply tried to search for some
(irrelevant) formulas in the book, and plugged in the numbers they found in the
problem into formulas to produce a nonsensical answer. To ease students’
anxiety, they were told that they would be given credit for trying to understand
the problem (the first of the four principles in George Pólya’s problem solving
strategy7).
A detailed analysis of the mammography problem immediately followed the
quiz. Although it was shocking for many students to learn that medical tests are
frequently inaccurate, after an initial disbelief it was not too difficult for them to
accept the possibility of two types of positive results, true and false, quantified by
sensitivity (true positive rate) and false positive rate, respectively. Students were
shown the CDC site to understand base rates with real data. They were then
guided to translate the problem into frequency format, and construct a tree similar
to Figure 1.
After this lesson, students were given another quiz in the next class, with a
different base rate for a different group of women (e.g., women in their fifties
instead of forties) using the data from the CDC. For the second quiz, some
students could construct the tree of natural frequencies and obtain the correct
answer. Many got the general idea but failed to execute the calculations
accurately in each step. A common difficulty is a lack of proficiency in
percentage calculations. For example, some students cannot translate 1.5% of
1000 people as 15 people. This situation is quite common among community
college students who need math remediation before undertaking a college-level
course. Again there was a review of Gigerenzer’s method and its application to
the quiz problem immediately after the quiz. This activity—a low-stakes quiz
with a follow-up discussion and analysis—was repeated several times until most
students became comfortable with the problem. The medical diagnosis problem is
included in one of the three high-stakes examinations and the final examination.
The mammography problem is not the only example of our Bayesian
reasoning training. We also asked students to calculate the probability of
pregnancy given a positive test result (e.g., Fig. 2), the probability of admission to
a prestigious university given a high SAT score, or the probability that a
boyfriend is cheating given that a pair of woman’s underwear was found in his
drawer (which most students found amusing).
.
7

In his influential book How to Solve It (1945), George Pólya suggested the following steps when
solving a mathematical problem: (1) understand the problem; (2) devise a plan; (3) carry out the
plan; (4) look back.
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Figure 2. Two students’ solution to estimation of the probability of pregnancy
given a positive test result with the following information: 2% of women are
pregnant; a test has a sensitivity rate of 80% and false positive rate of 0.5%.
On the top, a student obtained the correct probability, but on the bottom a
students confused 0.5 and 0.5% and obtained the incorrect answer

Figure 3 shows the result of student performance collected in the fall
semester of 2013. The area under the blue line represents the number of students
who successfully obtained the correct probability. “Partially correct,” under the
red line, represents students who correctly identified the base rate, sensitivity and
false positive rate, but failed to execute the calculations (mostly due to faulty
calculations exemplified in Figure 2). “Incorrect” describes students who were
unfamiliar with the nature of medical diagnosis, or confused over the three
different rates given in the problem. Non-constancy of the number of total
students is due to absence. From Figure 3, the gradual improvement in the
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performance of students as a group is evident. On the date of the second
examination (November 5, 2013), 14 out of 19 students (74%) obtained the
correct answer. The correct rate dropped slightly, to 68%, on the date of the final
examination (December 10, 2013), perhaps because some students forgot the
method or because there were slight variations in the composition of students
present at the testing dates.
The charts for the other two semesters show a similar pattern of gradual
improvement (Figure 4). The correct rates on the date of the final examination
were 71% (14 students in total) and 50% (16 students in total) for 2013 spring and
2014 spring, respectively. Toward the end of the semester, typically only 1 or 2
(out of approximately 20) students remained entirely unfamiliar with the medical
diagnosis problem (primarily due to their excessive absences). A striking feature
for the three semesters is that deficiency in elementary arithmetic skills continues
to prevent some students from obtaining the correct answer, despite their
comprehension of the meaning of prevalence, sensitivity and false positive rates.
This deficiency likely explains the discrepancy of correct rates between
community college students and those from the University of Chicago and
University of Munich reported in Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (2001).

Figure 3: Students’ performance on the mammography problem and other Bayesian
inference problems in 2013 Fall.
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Figure 4: Students’
performance on the
mammography problem
and other Bayesian
inference problems in 2013
Spring and 2014 Spring.

In addition to these in-class quizzes and examinations, a problem on the
hemoccult test for colorectal cancer (from Hoffrage and Gigerenzer 1998) was
given to students as a written assignment. Students were instructed to explain the
uncertain nature of a cancer screening program and the base rate, sensitivity and
false positive rate in plain language so that their parents and friends could
understand. They needed to show their calculations leading to the posterior
probability, and most importantly articulate how a personal decision would be
made based on the probability. Based on their writing, most students were able to
appreciate the need to weigh the costs and benefits associated with a test. Some
examples of concluding paragraphs from two students are the following:
A little under 5% of people who test positive actually have the cancer, this can lead to
expensive treatments when in fact you don’t even have the cancer. On the flip side if the
cancer is caught at an early stage it is definitely worth it.
4.8% is still much higher than the 0.3% base rate but instead of assuming the worst you
just have to look at all the numbers and think carefully and thoroughly. It is honestly a
useful message for almost all aspects of life.

Bloom’s taxonomy divides educational objectives into three domains:
psychomotor, cognitive, and affective (Bloom 1984). The medical diagnosis
problem that we used to teach Bayesian reasoning largely addresses the first two
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domains. 8 For the third domain, we administered a survey at the end of the
semester to gauge students’ attitudes toward medical testing after exposure to the
mammography and medical diagnosis problems, We selected three questions from
a Dartmouth Medical School study “Enthusiasm for Cancer Screening in the
United States” (Schwartz et al. 2004). Using Google Drive’s survey tool, students
anonymously responded to the following three questions.
1.

If there was a kind of cancer for which nothing can be done, would you want to be tested
to see if you have it?

2.

Routine screen means testing healthy persons to find cancer before they have any
symptoms. Do you think routine cancer screening tests for healthy persons are almost
always a good idea?

3. Would you prefer a total-body CT scan or receiving $1000 in cash?
Students’ responses are summarized in Figure 5. “Still want to know” means
“Yes” answer to the first question. “Always a good idea” means “Yes” answer to
the second question. “Choose CT” means that respondents prefer a total-body CT
scan in the third question. Standard errors for Schwartz et al. were provided by
Dr. Steven Woloshin, based on their national telephone interview of adults
conducted from December 2001 through July 2002 (S. Woloshin, personal
communication, November 10, 2013).

Figure 5: Student responses to 3 survey questions and their comparison with a national
survey. The sample size is n=500 for Schwartz et al. (2004); n=13, 20, and 17 for
2013 Spring, 2013 Fall, and 2014 Spring, respectively.
8
The interpretation of Bloom’s taxonomy has been evolving since 1956. Here we adapt the view
of Linda Suskie (2009), who categorized learning into three domains: (1) knowledge and
conceptual understanding; (2) thinking and other skills; (3) attitudes, values, dispositions, and
habits of mind. Chapter 8 of Suskie’s book is the reading for NICHE’s second unit—QR Learning
Goals.
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For three semesters, most students still want to know whether they have a
cancer even if nothing can be done; their need for certainty is consistent (within
the error bar) with the national survey results. However, most students appear to
realize that routine cancer screenings for healthy persons are not necessarily
always a good idea, and students’ responses were significantly different from the
national survey results. A total-body CT scan gives a very detailed picture of our
body; it has the potential to find many diseases but at the same time it can create
many false alarms. Again, students’ choices between receiving a full-body CT
scan versus cash deviate from the national survey results as the community
college students were less likely to opt for the former. Although there are many
possible explanations for the differences (e.g., college students tend to be
younger; community college students may have a greater need for money; and
public attitudes might have changed since 2002), it is plausible that the medical
diagnosis problem made students think more carefully and become less
enthusiastic about indiscriminate cancer screening.

Conclusions
In an elementary statistics course, the method of estimating conditional
probability (specifically solving the mammography and other Bayesian reasoning
problems) using natural frequency representations developed by Gerd Gigerenzer
and his collaborators was introduced to community college students. For this
group of students, deficiencies in elementary arithmetic skills are common.
Nevertheless, with repeated practice, many students have mastered the technique
and avoided the bias in judgment that is prevalent among medical professionals
reported in the literature. This result is very encouraging. Bayesian reasoning is a
crucial skill to navigate in the modern world, which is full of information
expressed in probabilistic terms, and our case study suggests that it is feasible to
teach such a skill that is built on psychological principles to underprivileged
students—the group of students for whom NICHE was designed.
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